Letters to the Editor by Kubbinga, Henk
  
 University of Groningen






IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2005
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Kubbinga, H. (2005). Letters to the Editor. Isis,  96(4), 622-623. https://doi.org/10.1086/498603
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
TO THE EDITOR:
I appreciate the opportunity to respond to Mary
Mosher Flesher’s review of my “Fighting for the
Good Cause”: Reflections on Francis Galton’s
Legacy to American Hereditarian Psychology
(Isis, 2004, 95:316–317).
Most of the problems I have with Flesher’s
review stem from her misinterpretation of two
terms I used in the book, “hard heredity” and
“soft heredity.” I felt I had supplied the long-
established definitions in sufficient measure—
for example, hard heredity denotes the imper-
meability of hereditary transmission to both
environmental and experiential factors (acquired
characters) and to birthmarking as well (p. 50).
I also juxtaposed the sociopolitical corollaries
that have issued from hard and soft heredity sub-
scriptions in a fashion meant to supplement the
definitions given (pp. 53–54). Nonetheless,
Flesher took hard heredity to be “the idea that
inheritance is the primary determinant of intelli-
gence” and soft heredity as “a more scientifically
accurate theory affirming the mutual influence of
inheritance and nurture.” Flesher seems hereby to
mistake terms reserved to the phylogenetic debate
over the susceptibility of hereditary transmission
to external interference (Weismannism vs. La-
marckism-plus) as terms to be employed in the
ontogenetic debate as to whether heredity or en-
vironment most influences development during
the course of the individual’s life (the more fa-
miliar nature–nurture controversy). Such misap-
plication looks to have dictated an unfortunate
misreading of my message and purposes.
For example, I advance my interpretation of the
famous pangenesis affair at some length (pp. 56–
66), arguing that the American psychologists I am
considering as Galton’s observers would have had
good cause to see him as secretly intent from the
first on overthrowing Darwin’s “provisional hy-
pothesis” as a polar antithesis to hard heredity
and, thus, a hazard to his newborn eugenics en-
terprise. Nowhere did I intend to imply what
Flesher somehow infers—that Galton failed to
adopt his cousin’s hypothesis as a “means to
move to a more scientifically accurate theory.”
Flesher misconstrues one of my discussions of
the American educational psychologist Edward
L. Thorndike in similar fashion. In attempting to
demonstrate that American hereditarian psy-
chologists were more conscious of the deficien-
cies of Galton’s and Karl Pearson’s evidence
than they were typically willing to admit, I cite
two of Thorndike’s considerations of Pearson’s
correlational study of the physical and mental
resemblances of young siblings, an investigation
published in 1901–1903 and widely regarded as
a major bulwark of the hereditarian argument. In
1903 Thorndike endorsed Pearson’s study un-
reservedly, as “perhaps the most valuable re-
search in educational psychology yet made” and
logically irresistible in its conclusions. In 1914
Thorndike painstakingly dismantled Pearson’s
study, stressing at the end its logical absurdity
(p. 100). I explain this remarkable volte-face as
merely Thorndike responding in kind to a recent
attack made on the American school of eugenics
by Pearson’s school, a classic case of expediency
trumping consistency, and a good indication of
the critical skills hereditarian psychologists
could apply to their own body of proofs when
so inclined. Flesher elects to read this reversal as
showing instead that Thorndike “does not fit
snugly into the mold of an unquestioning sup-
porter of the eugenics of Galton and Pearson,”
“given that [he] modified his position on hered-
ity in 1914 from ‘hard’ to ‘soft.’” Such a reading
of Thorndike’s turnabout would be untenable
even with the misapplied terms converted into
what Flesher seems to mean by them. Thorndike
could hardly have gravitated from a hereditarian
to an environmentalist position (in the nature–
nurture debate) by 1914 and have earned his en-
during reputation as the longest-term and most
consistent hereditarian of all his American psy-
chologist peers.
Finally, by objecting to the book’s devoting
“almost double the space to Pearson that [it] does
to the three American hereditarians,” Flesher
seems also to mistake its scope. The reason I
give for so extensively considering Galton’s and
Pearson’s development and promotion of the eu-
genics program is that the study seeks to illu-
minate openly visible features in that decades-
long process that could have encouraged these
psychologists to perceive Galton as covertly op-
posing, through his formulations of eugenics
doctrine and policy, the wide-open meritocracy
and wholesale democratization that he and his
nation saw hurtling toward them. As I explain in
several places (pp. 1–2, 50, 93), the study is
about what Galton (and Pearson) gave to these
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American observers in terms of doctrine, evi-
dence, and example; it is not about what these
legatees did with such a bequeathal—which, as




A brief book review and this post-review ex-
change is a small space in which to discuss the
complicated arguments in Gerald Sweeney’s
book “Fighting for the Good Cause”: Reflec-
tions on Francis Galton’s Legacy to American
Hereditarian Psychology.
Sweeney is correct that I did not in my reading
of his book, with its many twists and turns, stay
within the narrow confines of the phylogenetic
terms “hard” and “soft” heredity. In other words,
I did not avoid the term “nature–nurture,” which
rightly belongs with ontogenetic development.
However, in his short, prominent introductory
chapter Sweeney himself cites Thorndike’s
praise of “Galton’s rigidly hereditarian ruling on
the nature–nurture issue” (pp. 1–2), and he
opens the book’s last chapter on the American
hereditarian psychologists by announcing the
importance of heredity over environment for on-
togenetic development (p. 93).
Sweeney does argue that Thorndike’s 1911 sci-
entific critique of the inadequacy of Pearson’s
data supporting hard inheritance was provoked
into print only by a previous attack on him by a
Pearson adjutant, something he already knew but
would have kept surreptitiously quiet (p. 100). I
apologize.
The author interprets Galton’s interest in
“hard” heredity as only political—indeed, surrep-
titiously political, and thus requiring a scientific
cloak. In other places in the text, Sweeney casu-
ally notes that Galton did make scientific contri-
butions (p. 1). In the case of the pangenesis dis-
pute, however, Sweeney argues that Galton could
not accept pangenesis because it would under-
mine his “hard” hereditarian position, the funda-
mental support for his eugenics, his only real in-
terest being political support for the oligarchy.
Therefore, Sweeney does not accept that Galton
had any scientific concerns in spending a number
of years doing experimental work with blood
transfusions to disprove that aspect of Darwin’s
theory of pangenesis. This was only a sham to
keep peace with Darwin (pp. 58–66). I apologize
for misrepresenting Sweeney’s position.
Sweeney also states that I do not understand
the scope of his book. In the “Acknowledgments,”
the author concedes that much that is conjecture
here will receive confirmation in a second book
on which he is working (p. x). And true, the lan-
guage of the present book is full of conjectures
(probables, could haves, might haves), equivoca-
tions, and ironies. A book should stand on its own.
The idea of a proposed second book may help,
however, to explain the presence of an “Abstract”
at the beginning of this text (as though it were a
journal article), the short introductory chapter, and
the lack of a satisfactory concluding chapter.
Sweeney claims to have shown that American he-
reditarian psychologists, publicly admiring Gal-
ton as an inspiration for themselves, did not do so
on the basis of the quality of his science (“Ab-
stract”). Therefore, the book is only about Gal-
ton’s eugenic program as amended by Pearson
and establishing that Galton’s evidence gathering
was “something other than scientific inquiry, even
by the standards of his day” (p. 12).
The last chapter, however, makes three points
about when and how the American hereditarian
psychologists would have known about Galton’s
work. It seems that this information might have
better been placed in a second book than as the
concluding chapter of the first book. Placing
more of the important material of the earlier
chapters in the text rather than in the footnotes
would have made a sufficiently long book. The
second book is to show how the Americans, in
their classic period of influence (1903–1930)
and in their own context, were “instrumentally
informed by their perceptions of Galton’s ulte-
rior purposes,” purposes they clearly perceived
(p. 1). I believe that Sweeney’s theses are over-
stated, but then I have not seen the second book,
which is to confirm them.
The experience of reading this book leads me
to conclude that it was written directly for aca-
demic experts in the field of phylogeny and not,
as its primary concern with political motivations
and influence might indicate, for those who have
a general interest in British cultural history in the






Any historian of science justly takes pride in see-
ing his book reviewed in Isis. Sometimes, how-
ever, even in Isis, a maledictum slips in in the
place of a balanced judgment. Pierre Laszlo’s
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review of my book L’histoire du concept de
“molecule” (Isis, 2004, 95:728) is a case in
point. He does not tell the readership what this
three-volume work is all about but just points
out what, in his opinion as a chemist, ought to
have been in it, without even verifying whether
or not these “musts” are in the book. What be-
comes clear, to say the least, is that the history
of science does not necessarily coincide with the
history of chemistry.
My book describes the birth of the concept of
“molecule” in the seventeenth century, against
the background of the various theories of matter
that have played a role from antiquity onward.
The ancient atomists are there, and Plato has a
chapter of his own, while Aristotle and the Greek
and Latin Peripatetic tradition are dealt with in
depth. Epicurus’s and Lucretius’s theories are of
course analyzed with particular emphasis, be-
cause the first molecular theory was based on
their neo-atomism. Around 1620 two natural
philosophers coined the concept: the Dutchman
Isaac Beeckman (1588–1637) and the French-
man Se´bastien Basson (ca. 1580–after 1621).
From 1620 onward the molecular theory spread
across the sciences. It was, of course, not a ques-
tion of either chemistry or physics alone; crys-
tallography and mineralogy were also involved,
as were biology and medicine. In a way the de-
velopment culminated in the physics of Laplace,
a physics based on the recently proposed theory
of three states of aggregation: all natural phe-
nomena, even heat and electricity, were postu-
lated to be of a molecular kind. Therefore I could
rightly claim that molecularism had taken the
place of atomism, at least in a first approximation
of the problems involved. This was not an ill-
based claim: I read several papers on this topic—
for example, at the annual meeting of the History
of Science Society held in Pittsburgh in 1999.
Through the nineteenth century the molecular
theory was charming still other sciences. Even
philosophy came under its spell. The philosophie
positive of Auguste Comte indeed appears, on an
attentive reading of Comte’s Cours, to be a de-
rivative of Laplace’s exclusively molecular
physics. In two decades of intensive research on
source materials, my book grew to cover 1,890
fascinating pages in three volumes. The reader
will find there, I do hope, most, if not all, suc-
cessive connotations of the molecular idea. Suf-
fice it here to mention its first name: before the
word “molecule” existed, the notion was called
homogeneum (physicum) by its inventor, Isaac
Beeckman (ca. 1620), a word graciously bor-
rowed from Euclid’s Elements (def. 5.3).
One of the results of my in-depth research is
the finding that the Dutchman Herman Boer-
haave was but a poor chemist, who did not notice
the brilliance of the (molecular!) chemistry of
Stahl, later Lavoisier’s great opponent. Ever
since I have argued against Dutch colleagues—
fellow countrymen of mine—when they, some-
what shamelessly, dare to claim the contrary. In
much the same spirit I combat the systematic
overrating, in France, of Ampe`re’s chemistry:
perhaps Ampe`re was indeed to become a skilled
experimental physicist in the 1820s; nonetheless,
his paper of 1814 cannot bear comparison with
Avogadro’s paper of 1811, that genuinely bril-
liant piece of wonderful, straightforward chem-
istry (in my book Avogadro deservedly got some
fifteen pages, Ampe`re just a footnote). Talking
about the “hypothe`se Avogadro-Ampe`re,” as is
customary in French textbooks, is perhaps per-
missible for pedagogic reasons; omitting the
name of Avogadro, in 2004, while hailing Am-
pe`re’s “landmark 1814 article,” as Laszlo does
in his review, is both a chemical and a historio-
graphic error, if not a scandal. His nonspecific
(!) credit for the origin of the notion of a gram
molecule to Alexander Crum Brown (I think he
meant Crum Brown’s 1883 article “Molecule”
in the ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britan-
nica) is very much of the same kind.
Laszlo suggests, without giving a page number,
that I would claim that Perrin was the inventor of
the gram molecule concept. If he had indeed con-
sulted my book, he would have found (Vol. 3, pp.
1084 n 1, 1180) that his fellow countryman, my
friend Yves Noe¨l, demonstrated in the early 1980s
that the gram molecule concept, and more par-
ticularly its abbreviation “mole,” was introduced
by Wilhelm Ostwald (1893). It was based, not on
Crum Brown’s singularly irrelevant article in the
Encyclopaedia Britannica, but on several decades
of fine chemistry and, more particularly, Thom-
sen’s thermochemistry—all described in my book
(Vol. 3, p. 1089f.).
I passed the Ph.D. and the habilitation in Paris
under the aegis of the Centre Alexandre Koyre´
(EHESS) and still consider myself—if only by






Henk Kubbinga’s letter shows how opinionated
a scholar he is, which was already a major prob-
lem with his book. To be opinionated may be
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fine; to be biased is not a virtue. Kubbinga’s let-
ter also displays the one-upmanship (“I could
rightly claim,” “my in-depth research,” “dare to
claim the contrary,” “part of the French inner
circle”) that greatly mars his book. The narrow-
mindedness is illustrated here by the two debat-
able statements relative to Ampe`re and to the
Laplace–Comte connection.
Ampe`re’s chief merit was his distinction be-
tween—to use modern terminology—the atom
and the molecule (see M. Scheidecker-Chevalier
and R. Locqueneux, “La the´orie de la combinai-
son chimique d’A.-M. Ampe`re,” Revue d’Histoire
des Sciences, 1994, 47:309–352; and Schei-
decker-Chevalier, “L’hypothe`se d’Avogadro
[1811] et d’Ampe`re [1814]: La distinction atome/
mole´cule et la the´orie de la combinaison chi-
mique,” ibid., 1997, 50:159–194). Avogadro saw
his mole´cules constituantes as the fundamental
chemical units, not the mole´cules e´le´mentaires,
with only a mathematical essence (Marco Ciardi,
“Amedeo Avogadro’s Concept of the Atom:
Some New Remarks,” Ambix, 2001, 48:17–24).
Dumas—to mention a single chemist whose role
was significant in the development of atomic the-
ory—was influenced by Ampe`re’s, not by Avo-
gadro’s, paper. Avogadro was arguably in the tra-
dition of Lavoisier, outside the fold of Berthollet’s
physics.
Auguste Comte had little interest in chemistry,
which he considered a systematic kind of knowl-
edge—descriptive, minimally predictive, a mere
collection of observations—whose only contri-
bution to positive science was its nomenclature.
To claim that the Cours de philosophie positive
derives from molecular physics is a misreading.
I stand entirely by my review.
PIERRE LASZLO
P.O. Box 665
Pinehurst, North Carolina 28370 USA
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